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PEEPING PRESS VS. PRIVATE PERSECUTION:
A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND
FREEDOM FROM THE PRESS
Kunoor Chopra*
I. INTRODUCTION
[People] fear exposure not only to those closest to them; much
of the outrage underlying the asserted right to privacy is a
reaction to exposure to persons known only through business or
other secondary relationships. The claim is not so much one of
total secrecy as it is of the right to define one's circle of
intimacy-to choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask.
Loss of control over which 'face" one puts on may result in a
literal loss of self-identity, and is humiliating beneath the gaze
of those whose curiosity treats a human being as an object.1
An underlying tenet of our society is the right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. Unfortunately, the enjoyment of these rights may
also infringe on the rights of others. The question thus becomes, what-if
anything-do we have to do to resolve this conflict?
Courts have struggled with this question for over a century.' Constant
tension remains between the right to privacy and the public's right to know,
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1. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971) (en banc) (citations
omitted).
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE preamble (U.S. 1776).
3. Brett Jarad Berlin, Revealing the Constitutional Infirmities of the "Crime Victims
Protection Act, " Florida's New Privacy Statute for Sexual Assault Victims, 23 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 513, 514 (1995).
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as advanced by a free press.4 While the United States Constitution, through
the First Amendment, guarantees freedom of the press,5 states have
attempted to guarantee a person's right to privacy by enacting legislation
and amending their Constitutions. A fair balance is necessary because
these two rights cannot absolutely co-exist.
This Article focuses on finding a proper balance between the right to
free press and a rape victim's right to privacy. After analyzing the
rationale behind a free press, the recent court decisions in this area, and a
reasonable person's reactions, this Article argues that the freedom of the
press is not sacrificed when the name and identity of a rape victim is not
published. A balance may be accomplished by a new statute which would
prohibit the publication of a rape victim's name in particular circumstances,
while maintaining the goals and guarantees of the First Amendment.
Part II of this Article discusses the development of the right to
privacy. Part III discusses the policy arguments in favor of free press and
privacy. Part IV outlines and analyzes the development of the current
United States Supreme Court standard in determining whether or not to
publish a rape victim's name. Finally, Part V proposes a solution through a
new standard balancing the right to privacy and the rights to free press.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT To PRiVACY
The right to privacy protected under the U.S. Constitution is
historically rooted in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments.6 The federal constitutional right to privacy originated in
Griswold v. Connecticut,7 where the Supreme Court held that a Connecticut
law which prohibited the use and distribution of contraception was
unconstitutional.8 The Court did not base this decision on any explicit
privacy right, but rather found it implicitly in the First, Third, Fourth, and
Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.9  Many years later,
controversial cases such as Roe v. Wade ° based privacy rights on the word
"liberty" contained in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
4. Id. at 514-15.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); see Ken Gormley, One Hundred
Years of Privacy, 1992 WIs. L. REV. 1335, 1392 (1992).
7. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Dennis F. Hernandez, Litigating the Right to Privacy: A Survey of Current issues, in 1
LITIGATING LIBEL AND PRIVACY SUITS 425, 430 (1996).
9. Id.
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Amendment."' However, the right to privacy in the "free press vs. privacy"
context is not a pre-existing right with direct textual protection in the U.S.
Constitution. Rather, this right to privacy is a creature of invention,
ultimately derived from state legislation.
A. The Tort of the Invasion of Privacy
The concept of an individual right to privacy originated in 1890 in a
law review article co-authored by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis.' 2 Warren and Brandeis felt that people had a "right to be let
alone.""3  They articulated their concern for the changes in society by
stating:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the
world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has
become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy
have become more essential to the individual; but modern
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his
privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
14
It was not until the twentieth century that courts began to recognize
some form of a privacy right through tort law. In 1905, the Georgia
Supreme Court upheld the right to privacy in a case of commercial
exploitation of a person's name in advertising.' Subsequently, in 1927, a
court first recognized a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on the
dissemination of private information.1 6 In 1934, the Restatement (First) of
Torts adopted the tort of invasion of privacy.' 7
A 1960 law review article written by William L. Prosser was a major
stimulus for the new tort. 8 Prosser recognized four different categories of
privacy torts: (1) intrusion, (2) private facts, (3) false light, and (4)
11. Id. at 153; see Gormley, supra note 6, at 1393.
12. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 196.
15. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905).
16. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927).
17. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). The Restatement provides that "[a] person who
unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to
others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other." Id.
18. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
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misappropriation.' 9 The Restatement (Second) of Torts codified Prosser's
private facts tort,
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life
of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
hisprivacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of
legitimate concern to the public.
20
B. The States' Response
Many states have codified the right to privacy in their statutes.2'
Other states have added this new right to their constitutions.22  For
example, the California Constitution states: "All people are by nature free
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.
2 3
The California Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision
"creates a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian." 24
However, this right is not unfettered. An invasion of privacy may still be
allowed, provided that the invasion is justified by a compelling state
* 25interest.
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
RIGHT TO A FREE PRESS
Neither the "right to be let alone" nor the right to a free press is
absolute. Although these rights conflict, justifications exist for why neither
right should be abridged. The outcome of an individual case hinges on
which policy argument prevails.
19. Id. at 389.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
21. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 20.201 (1994); N.Y. Civ. RTS. LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 §§ 839.1-839.3 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-401 to 76-9-
406 (1995); VA. CODE §§ 2.1-377 to 2.1-386 (Michie 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West
1995).
22. See Alaska CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. an. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
23. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
24. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975).
25. Board of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979).
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A. Policy Arguments in Favor of the Right to Privacy
"The extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment
carry with them something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the
protected rights responsibly-a duty widely acknowledged but not always
observed by editors and publishers." 26
The privacy of a rape victim is necessary for many reasons. One
reason is that women have traditionally lacked power in society.27 As a
result, they are often victims of many types of crimes, including rape.28
Consequently, the effects of rape and the rationale for preserving privacy in
this arena will be explored by looking through a woman's viewpoint.
Keeping a rape victim's identity private is paramount because rape is
viewed as the most stigmatizing and traumatic of assaults.29 The United
States Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[s]hort of homicide, [rape] is
the 'ultimate violation of the self."' 30 Even though it is women who are the
victims of rape, society tends to shift the blame to them.3" When a woman
is raped, she suffers emotional and physical pain, as well as an additional
decrease in status by being blamed for the rape.
32
Some commentators argue that publishing a rape victim's name will
help erase such stigma.33 However, publicizing a victim's name will
instead strengthen the stigma by focusing the attention on the victim, and
may even perpetuate prejudicial views.3 Indeed, according to the Sexual
Violence Center in Minneapolis, such public disclosures reinforce sexual
assault stereotypes.35 Since sixty to eighty percent of rapes are committed
by a victim's acquaintance, date, or husband; the community usually does
not support the victim; the victim is often rejected by friends and family,
26. Berlin, supra note 3, at 518 (citations omitted).
27. See Terri Villa-McDowell, Privacy and the Rape Victim: The Inconsistent Treatment of
Privacy Interests in Two Recent Supreme Court Cases, 2 S. CAL. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 293, 331
(1992); Carol S. Goldstein, The Dilemma of the Rape Victim: A Descriptive Analysis, 7 INST.
CONTEMP. CORRECTION & BEHAVIOR SCI. 1, 3 (1976).
28. Many of the arguments I advance with regard to women can be applied to men. Other
issues will not be discussed due to the limited scope of this Article.
29. Berlin, supra note 3, at 518.
30. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
31. Berlin, supra note 3, at 518.
32. Id.
33. Michael Gartner, Naming Rape Victims: Usually, There Are Good Reasons To Do It,
USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 1991, at A6.
34. Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims' Identities, 64
S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1991).
35. Id at 1032-33.
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and questioned by employers.36 If such stereotypes about rape victims are
to be eradicated, change must begin with the people who foster such views,
such as parents, the media and politicians.37
Another reason exists to protect the identity of a rape victim. If a
woman is afraid that her identity will be made public, she may not report
the rape.38 Studies indicate that rape victims are more willing to report the
crime and assist authorities if they feel that their anonymity will be
guaranteed.39  The National Women's Study reports that seventy-six
percent of American women surveyed and seventy-eight percent of rape
victims surveyed favor legislation that prohibits publishing a rape victim's
identity. 40 One-half of the rape victims surveyed said they would be "a lot
more likely" to report rapes if the media was legally prevented from
acquiring and revealing their names and addresses.41 Sixteen percent said
they would be "somewhat more likely" to report being raped if they knew
their identity would remain confidential. 42 In addition, eighty-six percent
of everyone surveyed felt that a victim would be "less likely" to report a
rape if a victim believed the media would disclose her identity.43 Thus,
keeping a victim's identity confidential would likely encourage the
reporting of rape.
One commentator said that the result in Florida Star v. B.J.F.44
"perpetuated the crime of rape."4 5 She opined that the B.J.F Court was
reluctant to impose per se liability for disclosing a rape victim's identity
because of concerns about the victim's truthfulness.46 Consequently, while
rape was already underreported, after this case police have had more
discretion to consider "unfounded" reported rapes by refusing to investigate
them, and prosecutors may then decide not to file cases.47 Not only will
women be less likely to report rapes, but there will also be fewer
36. Id. As such, the majority of women who go public are white, middle-class women in
stable relationships who were raped by strangers. Id.
37. Id. at 1033-34.
38. Berlin, supra note 3, at 520.
39. Id.; see Deborah W. Denno, The Privacy Rights of Rape Victims in the Media and the
Law: Perspectives on Disclosing Victims' Names, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113, 1130 (1993)
(citing National Victim Ctr. and Crime Victims Research and Treatment Ctr., Rape in America: A
Report to the Nation (Apr. 23, 1992)).
40. Denno, supra note 39, at 1130.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Denno, supra note 39, at 1130-31.
44. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
45. Villa-McDowell, supra note 27, at 330; see discussion supra Part III.A.
46. Villa-McDowell, supra note 27, at 330.
47. Id
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convictions." The number of rapists will rise as perpetrators realize that
the chances of getting caught are very low.49 As Germaine Greer reported:
A man has to be very unlucky to be convicted of the crime of
rape. He has to be stupid enough, or drugged or drunk enough
to leave a mile-wide trail of blood, bruises, threats, semen,
screaming, and what have you, and he has to have chosen the
kind of woman about whom the neighbors have nothing but
good to say, who has enough chutzpah to get down to the police
station at once and file her complaint, and if it results in a trial,
to face down the public humiliation, for hearsay evidence about
her morals and demeanors is admissible. 0
Another reason the identity of a rape victim should be protected is
that a victim's identity is not truly newsworthy.5 An attack may be
reported without including the name, address, phone number and other
information that may identify the victim.5 2 The victim's identity does not
assist the public's understanding of the rape because it rarely correlates to
the reason for the crime.53 Free press advocates such as Michael Gartner,
have argued that this information is necessary to add credibility and
substance to the story.- However, this claim is without merit.
The media has access to and may cite various sources-including
police reports, court files, and judicial proceedings, which provide specific
details about the alleged rape.55 In addition, the press may obtain other
facts by interviewing the victim or through other investigative measures.56
As one commentator stated, '"ith [such] comprehensive information
available, whether the victim was named Jane Doe or Sue Smith is not a
necessary element to make a story believable. 57
The rationale behind the First Amendment also supports protecting
the identity of a rape victim.5" Non-disclosure furthers an important goal of
the First Amendment, namely, the search for truth.5 9 When people fear
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Berlin, supra note 3, at 520.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Gartner, supra note 33, at A6.
55. Marcus & McMahon, supra note 34, at 1034.
56. Id.
57. Marcus & McMahon, supra note 34, at 1034-35.
58. Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 WAsH. L. REv. 683,
711 (1996).
59. Id. at 708.
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media scrutiny of their private lives, they will be less likely to learn and
talk about issues, and thus will be discouraged froM seeking the truth.60
However, if the victim's identity is protected, they will be encouraged to
"participat[e] in public debate," thus promoting the First Amendment value
of truth.6' This public dialogue is necessary for victims to acknowledge the
rape and come forward with information.62 Such disclosure will facilitate
the apprehension of assailants, and encourage other victims to come
forward.6' This begins to eradicate the stigma associated with rape.
In addition, privacy promotes self-governance, a theory emphasizing
the necessity of free expression in a democracy. 64 Affording individuals
privacy will allow them to form their own thoughts, question their wisdom
and come to their own conclusions.65 People can then "make valuable
contributions to the public debate by questioning the status quo, first
privately, then publicly .... Thus, privacy is necessary to actualize our
vision of ourselves as a nation."' s Privacy contributes to women coming
forward and to educating the public. If victims are allowed to come to
terms with these issues first, they will provide positive contributions to help
make society safer.
Finally, privacy protects autonomy, which includes individualism and
self-realization. 67 This allows people to better themselves by forming their
own values and opinions.68 When women are given developmental
opportunities, they will have more to offer society.69 With autonomy, more
women will be willing to express themselves and offer this strength and
experience to other women. 70
B. Policy Arguments in Favor of the Right to a Free Press
"Regardless of how [beneficial] the purpose of controlling the press
might be, we ... remain intensely skeptical about those measures that
60. Id. at710--711.
61. Id at711.
62. Id.
63. See id at710, 711.
64. Id. at 713.
65. Scott, supra note 58, at 717.
66. Id.
67. Scott, supra note 58, at 717-18.
68. Scott, supra note 58, at 717-22.
69. Scott, supra note 58, at 723.
70. Id.
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would allow the government to insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of
,,71this Nation's press.
Our society prides itself on allowing people the freedom to express
their opinions, to engage in debate, and to be informed. To advance such
values, the First Amendment guarantee of free press is crucial. Among
explanations for affording protection to freedom of speech are: (1) self-
governance, (2) self-fulfillment and (3) a safety valve 
function. 72
Freedom of the press encourages the decision-making process. In the
marketplace of ideas, this exchange of ideas should lead to the truth.73
Freedom of the press also encourages self-fulfillment. It is important for
people to freely say, read, and hear, so that they will feel better about
themselves and contribute to society.74 Free press fulfills a safety-valve
function. If people can freely express themselves, they will be less likely to
resort to violence caused by pent-up feelings and thoughts.75
These rationales, based on the goals of the First Amendment, are
related to the "chilling effect" argument.76 The press argues that legislative
prohibitions lead to timidity and editorial self-censorship. 77 If the press is
held liable for the truthful publication of a rape victim's name, the press
may become overly cautious of what it publishes. 7 This may decrease the
"quality and quantity of information available to society."' 7
Another policy argument in favor of publishing a rape victim's name
is that publication will help eliminate the stigma attached to rape. ° The
press will educate the public to eradicate impressions and stereotypes
which currently tend to blame a victim."' Furthermore, if the rape victim's
name is not published, newspapers would be contributing to this
"conspiracy of silence."8 2 Finally, publicizing a rape victim's name
informs the public and adds credibility to the story.
71. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,259 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
72. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT §§ 1.02-1.04 (1984).
73. Id. § 1.02[A], at 1-7.
74. Id. § 1.03, at 1-49 to 1-50.
75. Id. § 1.04, at 1-53.
76. Berlin, supra note 3, at 522-23.
77. Id.
78. Berlin, supra note 3, at 523.
79. ld.
80. Id.
81. Gartner, supra note 33, at A6.
82. Id.
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
THE CURRENT STANDARD
Critics argue that the tort of invasion of privacy is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has torn away at the privacy tort and established its
own standard.
A. Important Supreme Court Decisions
Four Supreme Court cases define the current standard regarding
disclosure of a rape victim's name. The standard took root in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,8 where the father of a deceased rape victim
brought an invasion of privacy action against a broadcasting company that
revealed his daughter's identity during television coverage of the rape trial.
One of the company's reporters obtained the victim's name by examining
the indictments that were in the courtroom. 4 The Georgia statute at issue
made revealing the identity of a rape victim a misdemeanor.
85
The broadcasting company asserted that the information was a record
open to public inspection, and that the victim's name was of public
importance.8 6  The Georgia Supreme Court held that the statute was
constitutional and could find "no public interest or general concern about
the identity of the victim of such a crime as will make the right to disclose
the identity of the victim rise to the level of First Amendment protection."87
Although the statute did not create a civil cause of action, the court allowed
the plaintiff to proceed under the tort of public disclosure.88
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed this decision. 9 Justice White, in a
majority opinion, acknowledged that a zone of privacy exists for each
individual, which the state can protect from the press' intrusion.9°
However, the Court held the statute was unconstitutional and that the press
could publish facts in the public record. 9' The Court focused on the
media's duty to inform the public and on the fact that the information
83. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
84. Id. at 472.
85. Id. at 471-72; see GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
86. Id. at 475.
87. Marietta Broad. Co. v. Advance Marketing Research, Inc., 200 S.E.2d 134 (1973).
88. Id.; see Suzanne M. Leone, Protecting Rape Victims' Identities: Balance Between the
Right to Privacy and the First Amendment, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 883, 890 (1993).
89. Cox, 420 U.S. at 497.
90. Id. at 487.
91. Id. at 496-97.
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published was already publicly available.92 However, the Court failed to
address whether the press would be free from sanctions regardless of the
source of the information.
93
Two years later, the Court defined the standard for disclosing a rape
victim's name in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court.94 That Court
considered the constitutionality of a pre-trial order enjoining the press from
publishing the name or picture of a juvenile defendant. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court upheld the order, relying on state statutes limiting public
access to juvenile proceedings unless otherwise ordered by the judge.95
The goal of these statutes seemed to be preventing the identities of juvenile
defendants from becoming public. However, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the pre-trial order violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 96
Under Cox, the media would avoid sanctions for publishing the names of
juveniles because the information was public.97 The Court did not rule on
the constitutionality of the Oklahoma statutes prohibiting public access to
juvenile proceedings. 98
The third case contributing to the current standard used in
determining the propriety of rape victim anonymity is Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co.99 At issue was a West Virginia statute prohibiting the press
from publishing the name of a juvenile offender without prior written court
authorization.1 °  The defendant learned the name of the child by
interviewing witnesses at the scene of the shooting, 1 1 and subsequently
published the juvenile's name after it had been revealed by other media
sources. 02 The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional.
0 3
For the first time, the Court expressly set forth a First Amendment
balancing test. °4 The Court stated that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
92. Id. at 495.
93. Id. at 495 n.26.
94. 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977).
95. See id. at309-10.
96. Id. at311-12.
97. Id. at311.
98. Id. at 310.
99. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
100.W. VA. CODE §§ 49-7-3, 49-7-20 (1976).
101. Smith, 443 U.S. at 99-100.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 104-05.
104. Scott, supra note 58, at 694.
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officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order."10 5
The state's interest in Smith was protecting the identity of the juvenile
offender in order to further his rehabilitation. 106 However, the Court struck
down the statute because the state interest was not furthered by criminal
penalties against newspapers. 0 7 The state statute was flawed because the
ban on publication did not apply to all types of media; therefore, according
to the Court, the state's purpose in enacting the statute was not
accomplished. 108
The above-mentioned trilogy of cases led to the present standards for
publishing a victim's identity as enunciated in Florida Star v. B.JF.1 9 In
Florida Star, B.J.F. sued the Florida Star for publishing her name in an
article concerning her rape. "0 A reporter-trainee copied the victim's police
report on the victim verbatim."' The report was available in the police
department pressroom, where signs were posted warning people not to
publish the identity of the rape victim." 2 The paper published the victim's
name violating Florida's statute, in addition to the paper's internal
policy." 3  At the time of the publication, the assailant had not been
caught." 4 As a result, B.J.F. was harassed and even threatened with rape
again.11
The Florida statute at issue made it unlawful to "print, publish, or
broadcast... in any instrument of mass communication" the identity of a
rape/sexual assault victim. 116 In finding this statute unconstitutional, the
Court synthesized the Daily Mail test and the principles set forth in the
trilogy of cases, and created a two step analysis. 117 First, the Court had to
determine whether the newspaper "lawfully obtain[ed] truthful information
about a matter of public significance.""' 8 "Public significance" refers to
105. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103.
106. Id. at 104.
107. Id. at 104-05.
108. Id. at 107-08; see Leone, supra note 88, at 894.
109. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
110. ld. at 528.
111. Id. at 527.
112. Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
113. id. at 528; see Leone, supra note 88, at 896.
114. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 528.
115. Id. Victim's mother received threatening phone calls from a man who said he would
rape victim again. Id.
116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (1987).
117. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536-37.
118. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103.
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whether the article concerned a matter of paramount public import, which
in this case was the commission and investigation of a crime.119 The
second step required determining whether imposing liability served "a need
to further a state interest of the highest order."' 20
Even though the Court acknowledged that there were significant state
interests in not reporting a rape victim's name, it held that the Florida
statute was unconstitutional. However, the Court's reasoning for allowing
the publication of the victim's identity is unconvincing. The Court made a
weak attempt at protecting the First Amendment over what appears to be a
more compelling interest in privacy. 12' Thus, it seems that the Court found
that the state's interests in protecting the privacy of rape victims, ensuring
their safety, and encouraging victims to report crimes, were not compelling.
B. Analyzing the Court's Balancing Test
The standards enunciated in Florida Star give undue deference to the
press and undervalues the state's interest in privacy.122 The standard has
two components. The first part of the analysis, composed of two sub-
elements, asks: (1) whether the identity of the rape victim was lawfully
obtained and (2) whether the name is a matter of public significance. 123
The Florida Star Court's main focus was whether the information was
lawfully obtained. 124 The Court concluded that because the government
was at fault for leaving the victim's name in the record, 25 it should then
bear full responsibility. 126  This decision gives the press free reign to
disclose this information, with the press having little or no responsibility
regarding the protection of the victim's identity. 127 Through the use of this
test, the Court is allowing the media to print any truthful information it
legally obtains. 28  This standard is troublesome because it gives future
courts a dangerous precedent to rely on. 129  The media should not be
119. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536-37.
120. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103.
121. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
122. Leone, supra note 88, at 906.
123. Leone, supra note 88, at 902.
124. Id.
125. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 538.
126. Id at 534-35.
127. Leone, supra note 88, at 903.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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allowed to capitalize on any information they receive, but should instead be
held accountable for their actions.1
30
The second part of the Florida Star analysis considers whether the
name of the rape victim is of public significance, and thus newsworthy.' 3 '
The Supreme Court did not set out a standard for defining newsworthiness,
but the California Court of Appeal in Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc.
132
summarized the California case law into a three part test. Under that
standard, a court must look at: "[1] the social value of the facts published,
[2] the depth of the article's intrusion ostensibly into private affairs, and [3]
the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public
notoriety.'
133
Although rape is an extremely private affair and the victim does not
intend to place herself in the limelight, the debate continues over whether
there is any social value to the publication of a victim's name. As
mentioned above, a victim's name has little or no social value.' 34 It does
not add to the credibility of the story. 135 If a story about a rape is published
in a reputable paper, readers will generally accept it as true.' 36 The victim's
name will not make the story more believable. If necessary, a pseudonym
may be used. With all the resources available to the media and police, fact-
finding about the rape is possible without publishing the victim's name. 1
7
Under this test, it would seem that a victim's name falls short of being
newsworthy. However, the Court did not focus on the newsworthiness of
the victim's name but rather on whether the article itself was
newsworthy. 3 8 Removing the victim's name does not detract from its
newsworthiness.
Another way to define newsworthiness is to focus on self-governance
as a basis for the press' First Amendment protection. 39 The public has the
right to know the truth to aid in its decision making.' 4° To determine
whether something is newsworthy, one only needs to consider whether the
information at issue is "useful to citizens in making them better able to
130. Leone, supra note 88, at 904.
131. Id.
132. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
133. Id at 772; see Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (citations
omitted).
134. Leone, supra note 88, at 907.
135. Marcus & McMahon, supra note 34, at 1034-35.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536.
139. Leone, supra note 88, at 907.
140. Id.
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govern themselves. 14' Following this rationale, it seems that any
reasonable person would say that the name does not contribute to self-
governance. On the contrary, publication would detract from self-
governance. 42 Victims must feel free to report rape without fear of
reprisal. The public is interested in information regarding the commission
of a violent crime and the rape victim's name adds little to the value of the
information. On the other hand, publicizing the victim's name discourages
the victim from reporting the rape and reduces the legitimate self-
governance information available to the public.' 43 Holding the media liable
may result in a positive effect on society.144 If rape victims are allowed
recourse, they will continue to come forward and provide information for
the public. 141
The next component of the Florida Star test is whether the limitation
on the media is necessary to further a compelling state interest.1"' Three
state interests were given in Florida Star: "the privacy of victims of sexual
offenses; the physical safety of such victims, who may be targeted for
retaliation if their names become known to their assailants; and the goal of
encouraging victims of such crimes to report these offenses without fear of
exposure." 147  These are important state interests because rape victims
should have the right to control information about themselves and should
not be subjected to the stigma attached to rape.' Also, if the attacker has
not been apprehended, a state has an interest in protecting the victim's
physical safety.' 49 Lastly, rape victims are more likely to report a rape if
they feel that their identities will not be released. 
50
The Florida Star Court however, held that the statute did not serve
these interests. First, by making the victim's name public, the government
implied that the information was of public importance. 151 Second, the
statute was overbroad because it imposed liability without regard for
whether the victim was already known in the community, voluntarily called
141. Suzanne Reynolds Greenwood, Privacy: The Search for a Standara 11 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 659 (1975).
142. Julia A. Loquai, Keeping Tabs on the Press: IndividualRights v. Freedom of the Press
Under the First Amendment, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 447, 459-60 (1993).
143. Id. at 460.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537.
147. Id
148. Leone, supra note 88, at 910-11.
149. Leone, supra note 88, at 911.
150. Leone, supra note 88, at 912.
151. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 538-39.
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public attention to the offense, or whether the identity of the victim had
already become of public concern. 52 Lastly, the statute was underinclusive
and only applied to mass communication, making no provision for the
public's dissemination of the victim's name.153
It appears that the Court wanted to find the statute unconstitutional.
The majority of the Court failed to consider that Florida had an interest in
protecting the identity of rape victims despite the fact that Florida had
enacted a privacy statute and had signs in the police pressroom warning
against revealing the identity of rape victims.'- 4 Furthermore, the Court did
not inquire whether the victim's name had been made public. Instead, the
Court struck down Florida's statute without giving sufficient weight to the
state's interests.
The flaw in the Court's reasoning may be better understood by
comparing the reasoning in Florida Star with that in United States
Department ofJustice v. Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press.'"
In Reporter's, the media brought a request under the Freedom of
Information Act 5 6 for criminal records that the Justice Department and FBI
possibly had regarding individuals involved in organized crime. 157 The
issue was whether there was a privacy interest in not disclosing the names
of these individuals even though the once public records were now hard to
find. 158
The Court balanced the right to privacy with the public's right to
know, and argued that there was a "vast difference between the public
records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files,
county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of
information.' 5 9 The Court stated that the identities of individuals in rap
sheets were not important to the public's understanding of the law
enforcement system. 16° The Court applied this rule categorically, and did
not provide for a case-by-case determination.161
152. Id. at 539.
153. Id. at 540..
154. Id. at 528.
155. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
156. Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX7XC) (Supp. V 1982).
157. Villa-McDowell, supra note 27, at 300.
158. Id
159. Reporter's, 489 U.S. at 764.
160. Id. at 766 n.18.
161. Villa-McDowell, supra note 27, at 302.
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The interests advanced in Reporter's were the same interests
advanced in Florida Star. 62  However, the Reporter's Court and the
Florida Star Court conveniently used two different understandings of
"public significance. 1 63  In its normative sense, "public significance"
refers to speech that contributes to the public's understanding essential to
self-government. 164 In its descriptive sense, "public significance" includes
matters of public curiosity. 65 In Reporter's, the rap sheet was considered
in its descriptive sense, and in Florida Star it was considered to be of
paramount public importance. 66 There appears to be flawed reasoning in
both of these cases, as the Court used two different meanings of "public
significance." Consequently, these holdings should be reversed.
V. THE NEW RIGHT To PRIVACY: A FAIR BALANCE
There are many problems with the Florida Star Court's approach and
reasoning. It appears as though the Court viewed the case with a
predetermined outcome in mind, and failed to consider all the factors
involved in the case. Admittedly, there were problems with the statute at
issue in Florida Star. Most importantly, it was unconstitutional due to
overbreadth and vagueness. However, it is possible to draft a constitutional
statute that protects the names of rape victims.
A. The Recently Enacted Crime Victims Protection Act
In 1995, Florida passed a new Crime Victims Protection Act
16 7
("CVPA") after the Court invalidated the previous statute in Florida Star
and in State v. Globe Communications Corp.168 Section 92.56 of the
CVPA requires that five independent factors be satisfied in order for the
rape victim to receive protective anonymity. 69 The factors are:
(a) The identity of the victim is not already known in the
community;
(b) The victim has not voluntarily called public attention to the
162. Id. at 303.
163. Id. at 311-312.
164. Id. at 311.
165. ld.
166. Id. at 312.
167. Crime Victims Protection Act, § 1, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 95-207 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 92.56).
168. 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994); see Berlin, supra note 3, at 541.
169. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.56 (West Supp. 1999). This section applies to many crimes
including rape/sexual assault, child abuse and sexual performance by a child.
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offense;
(c) The identity of the victim has not otherwise become a
reasonable subject of public concern;
(d) The disclosure of the victim's identity would be offensive to
a reasonable person; and
(e) The disclosure of the victim's identity would: ... [e]ndanger
the victim;... [clause severe emotional or mental harm to the
victim; ... [m]ake the victim unwilling to testify as a witness;
or... [ble inappropriate for other good cause shown.' 70
Once these factors are satisfied, all court records revealing the
victim's name, address, or photograph become confidential and exempt
from Florida's constitutional public disclosure provisions.171 Anyone who
makes the records public will be held in contempt.'7 However, the
restriction on using a victim's name is not absolute. States may use
pseudonyms instead of the victim's name in public documents.'
Additionally, the defendant is not precluded from obtaining the victim's
name in preparation of his defense and may therefore petition the trial court
for an order of disclosure.'74 Lastly, the victim may waive the protection of
this section. 175
B. The Proposed Rape Victims Protection Act
The CVPA was a clear attempt by the Florida legislature to correct
the constitutional problems with the previous privacy statute. However,
even this Act is unconstitutional under Forida Star.176 With some changes
however, the Act would probably be found constitutional.
First, section 92.56 is overbroad, because it applies to a multitude of
crimes. 177 The statute is not limited to protecting rape victims but also
170. Id. § 92.56(1).
171. Id.
172. Id. §§ 92.56(2), 92.56(6).
173. Id. § 92.56(3).
174. Id § 92.56(4).
175. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.56(4).
176. Berlin, supra note 3, at 541, 545-559. The First Amendment objections include:
overbreadth with respect to what is covered by the statute; problematic statutory language
regarding the prohibited speech-act and the susceptible speakers; problematic statutory language
regarding what will become confidential; problematic statutory language limiting the
reproduction of testimony; problems regarding who may argue for anonymity under the Act; and
problems regarding individualized adjudication under the Act. Id.
177. In addition to rape victims, the section applies to victims of child abuse, aggravated
child abuse or sexual performance by a child in addition to rape victims. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
92.56(2) (West Supp. 1998).
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shields victims of other sexual crimes and some non-sexual child abuse.
178
The result is that the Act suppresses more speech than necessary-"speech
that the state does not have a compelling interest to suppress.' 79
The Florida legislature has not shown that the social stigma associated
with rape, and the reluctance to report or assist authorities also exists in
instances of aggravated child abuse or child molestation.8 0 The state's
interests are not equally significant for all of the crimes covered by the
Act. ' There are different interests to be protected when rape is involved
and so the act needs to be specific.8 2 Therefore, the new Act will be called
the Rape Victims Protection Act and will only apply to rape victims.
Four of the five requirements of section 92.56 should be retained in a
revised statute in order for the rape victim to receive protective anonymity.
First, the victim's identity cannot be newsworthy, or a reasonable subject of
public concern.8 3  Courts have held that names are not always
newsworthy. 84 For instance, in Y.G. and L.G. v. Jewish Hospital of St.
Louis,'85 the plaintiffs had participated in an in vitro fertilization
program.186 The hospital held a social function for them, and plaintiffs
specifically told the media that they did not want to be filmed. 87 The
media nevertheless filmed the function and aired it on television. 88 The
court found that even though the in vitro program was a matter of public
interest, the identity of the parties participating in it were private, or in
other words, not of public concern. 89 The court stated that matters of
procreation, sexual relations, and medical treatment are all private
matters.' 9 Ironically, this means that a woman's identity is only protected
if the sexual encounter is consensual.
In Barber v. Time, Inc.,' 9' the plaintiff sued for a violation of her right
to privacy when the defendant published an article with plaintiff's picture
178. Berlin, supra note 3, at 545.
179. Id at 545.
180. Id. at 546.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 545-559.
184. See Y.G. & L.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
Barberv. Time 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
185. 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
186. Id. at 492.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 500.
190. Id.
191. 159 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942).
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about a physical ailment for which she was being treated. The court held
that the right to privacy, at the very least, should include an individual
attaining medical treatment without publicity.' 92 This is beneficial to
patients as it allows them to be open about their illness, which is necessary
for physicians to treat them properly. 93 A patient's candor about their
illness is more likely when the patient harbors no fear of the publication of
any potentially embarrassing or harmful information.'94
These arguments exemplify why the names of victims are private and
not newsworthy. Both Jewish Hospital and Barber involved issues of
public concern-in vitro fertilization and physical ailment. Medical
information is very newsworthy, but courts have held that publishing
patients' names is not of public concern. Likewise, in areas of rape, where
the incident is of public concern, the names of rape victims' should be
deemed private. The public is well informed by receiving information on
the particular issue. Adding the victim's name into a news story does not
add to the public's understanding of the incident.
The courts in medical cases have particularly stated that the names are
not newsworthy. 95 Rape victims deserve similar protection. In medicine,
one reason for privacy is to allow people to obtain medical treatment
without the fear of embarrassing information being revealed.'96 This same
protection is necessary for rape victims. To ensure that victims will report
rapes and assist authorities, victims must be confident that they will not
receive unwanted publicity. Critics argue that names are necessary for
credibility and to assist in finding witnesses or other information. 197
However, with the extensive array of resources available to the media and
police, it is entirely possible for them to obtain information without
disclosing the identity of rape victims.
Second, the victim must not voluntarily call public attention to the
offense. 98 In Diaz v. Oakland Tibune,'99 the plaintiff underwent gender
corrective surgery but took every measure to ensure that it remained
confidential. 20 0 The defendant publicized the plaintiff's surgery.2"' Even
though the plaintiff was the first female student body president of her
192. Id at 295.
193. Id. (citing 21 R.L.C. 378 § 24).
194. See id
195. Y.G. &L.G, 795 S.W.2d at 488, 500.
196. Barber, 159 S.W.2d at 295.
197. See discussion supra, Part III.A-B.
198. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.56 (West Supp. 1999).
199. 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983).
200. See id at 765.
201. Id. at 766.
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college and was well-known, the California court found that she did not
voluntarily draw attention to her surgery.20 2 Under that reasoning, if a rape
victim is in the public eye, it cannot be found that she has voluntarily called
attention to the rape. Drawing voluntary attention is specific to the crime
and not to the rest of the rape victim's life.
Third, the disclosure should be considered offensive to a reasonable
person. This standard would not apply to an abnormally sensitive
person.203 However, this does not require that the information be
considered repulsive.204 There are many disclosures that courts have found
to be offensive. In Gallon v. Hustler Magazine,0 5 the court found that the
unpermitted publication of a nude photograph of a person is "highly
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. '2 06 In Hillman v.
Columbia County,207 disclosing HIV test results was also considered to be
offensive, even when the disclosure affected a person in jail.
Also, in Miller v. Motorola, Inc.,°s the court held that an employer's
disclosure of the plaintiff's mastectomy surgery could be considered
offensive and left it for the jury to decide.2° In light of the holdings from
these cases, disclosure of the fact that a victim was raped would seem
extremely offensive. Rape is involuntary, similar to contracting HIV or
requiring most surgeries. Rape is embarrassing and stigmatizing, similar to
having a nude picture of an individual published without consent or having
an individual's HIV status revealed. Any reasonable person would be
offended by such disclosures.
Lastly, a compelling state interest in protecting the victim's privacy
must exist. The statute should protect privacy when disclosing the victim's
identity would endanger the victim because the assailant has not been
apprehended, is not otherwise known, or when there is the likelihood of
retaliation, harassment, or intimidation. Privacy should also be protected
202. See id at 773.
203. Scott, supra note 58, at 691; see Prosser, supra note 18, at 397.
204. Scott, supra note 58, at 691 n.39.
205. 732 F. Supp. 322 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
206. Id. at 325.
207. 474 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
208. 560 N.E.2d 900 (I11. Ct. App. 1990).
209. Id. at 903.
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where disclosure would cause severe emotional or mental harm to the
victim or would make the victim unwilling to testify.
A court should have flexibility to account for unpredictable situations.
Therefore, disclosure may also be prohibited if other good cause is shown.
For example, if one of the four factors is not met, but there is great
likelihood that the victim's life is in danger, the court may prohibit
disclosure. The statute should also provide for disclosure if good cause is
shown; this includes when a state's interest in non-disclosure is outweighed
by a competing First Amendment interest because the victim is dead or is a
foreigner. The burden to demonstrate good cause should rest on the
defendant.
An example of a compelling state interest is present in Times-Mirror
Co. v. Superior Court.210 The plaintiff discovered the dead body of her
roommate and was able to identify the killer to the police. 21' The defendant
got this information, including the plaintiffs name, from the coroner's
office.21 2 The plaintiff told friends, family, and neighbors, and then
confronted the murderer.21 3 In addition, the police and employees of the
coroner's office knew her name and identity.214 The plaintiff was also
questioned about the incident by the police in public.215 Based on these
facts, the court concluded that:
[W]here an individual observes and can identify a suspected
murderer who is still at large, the First Amendment provides no
absolute protection from liability for printing the witness's
name. The individual's safety and the state's interest in
conducting a criminal investigation may take precedence over
the public's right to know the name of the individual.1 6
The court in Hyde v. Columbia also found that the news media could
be held liable for publishing of a victim's name where safety is involved.2 7
The court held that:
[T]he name and address of an abduction witness who can
identify an assailant still at large before arrest is a matter of such
trivial public concern compared with the high probability of risk
to the victim by their publication, that a news medium owes a
210. 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1988).
211. Id.
212. 1d. at 558.
213. Id. at 560.
214. Id. at 560-61.
215. Id. at 561.
216. Times-Mirror, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
217. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
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duty in such circumstances to use reasonable care not to give
likely occasion for a third party [the assailant still at large] to do
injury to the plaintiff by the publication.218
Based on this reasoning, a rape victim's name should not be disclosed
when the assailant is at large or judicial proceedings have not begun. In
these instances, there is the risk that the assailant may escape or that his
family or friends will try to take revenge on the plaintiff. These risks far
outweigh any interest in disclosing the rape victim's name.
Once these four factors are met, all court and other legal records that
reveal the victim's name, address, and photograph (or any other
information from which a reasonable person could identify the victim)
become confidential and exempt from a state's constitutional disclosure
provisions. Types of records included are reporter, clerk, and deposition
transcripts, and also witness testimony. Records become confidential when
they reveal the victim's identity. Once the identity revealing information is
blackened out, redacted, or replaced by a pseudonym, the record is no
longer confidential.
A person or institution may not knowingly or maliciously spread
word of or publish the victim's identity. This applies to anyone, including
media, small-time disseminators, and people discussing the crime on the
street. However, this prohibition does not apply to the victim's close
family, friends, or police. This is necessary to assist the victim in reporting
the rape, to assist authorities in gathering information about the rape, and to
decrease the stigma and embarrassment. Courts have not considered this to
be publication. For example, in Times-Mirror, the plaintiff's identity was
not public just because she was questioned by police in public or because
she told certain neighbors, friends and family members about the crime.219
Also, in Diaz, the plaintiff telling her family that she had a sex change was
not considered a public fact.
220
In addition, any person who questionably, unethically or unlawfully
obtains and publishes or reveals the identity revealing information may be
held in contempt. This is an area where the courts should give more
deference. For example, in Florida Star, the press revealed the victim's
identity despite the fact that the police pressroom had signs warning against
such publication. 221 Although this was not considered to be unlawfully
obtained, it should have been punished as being unethical or questionable
218. Id. at269.
219. Times-Mirror, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
220. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (1983).
221. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 546 (1989).
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conduct. Similarly, in Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. v. Tatum,2 2 the
result was improper. A sexual assault victim brought an action against a
newspaper that published her name.22' The investigating officers gave her
name to two reporters admonishing them not to publish it, yet they
published it anyway.2 4 The court held that the newspaper legally obtained
truthful information.225 In these types of situations, courts need to be more
conscientious of the importance behind not disclosing the victim's identity.
While government officials should take necessary measures to keep
identities private, the media must also abide by some standards of decency.
If one is asked not to publish something, such a request should be honored.
The Act also applies to repeaters, people who publish the victim's
name after it has been revealed by other sources. There are still compelling
interests in not further publishing victims' names. The victim's identity
may have been revealed, but the disseminator of this information may still
be sued or held in contempt of court. Furthermore, the information may
only be public to a limited amount of people and further publication could
cause more damage. There may be a point at which publication would
cause no further damage, and the defendant would then be able to show
good cause for why the information should be disclosed.
In accord with section 92.56, pseudonyms must be used instead of the
victim's name to designate the rape victim in all court records. The
defendant may apply to the trial court for an order disclosing the victim's
identity in order to prepare a defense. A court order would direct that this
information not be revealed or used for any other purpose. The protection
of this section may be waived by the victim in a writing filed with the
court, in which the victim consents to the use or release of identifying
information during court and pre-trial proceedings and their records.
This proposed section should apply to all pre-trial proceedings. Once
trial begins, broadcasting the victim's identity is permitted because many of
the compelling interests supporting the victim's privacy may no longer
exist. However, if interests in protecting the victim's privacy continue,
these interests would more likely be outweighed by First Amendment
interests in a free press.226 In addition, the judge has discretion on whether
to allow cameras, but media personnel and members of the public would be
allowed. If good cause is shown, the judge may admonish the media and
public not to publish any identity revealing information.
222. 430 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
223. Id. at 20.
224. Id. at 20-21.
225. Id.
226. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There are tensions between the right to privacy and the First
Amendment. These tensions may be resolved to some extent when the
Court applies a balancing test. In previous cases, statutes have been found
unconstitutional, and the states' interests in protecting the privacy of rape
victims have been discredited and not properly balanced with the media's
First Amendment right to a free press. Florida attempted to resolve these
problems in the CVPA. This statute, however, is not likely to survive
judicial scrutiny in its present form. The New Rape Victims Act as
proposed by this Article attempts to resolve the constitutional infirmities of
the CVPA. If such changes are adopted by state legislatures, rape victims
may finally receive fair treatment in the courts.
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